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Few issues have received more inquiry in the social sciences
than “”what are the fundamental determinants of comparative
development?”” The institutional view asserts that the ultimate
causes of underdevelopment are poorly performing institutional
structures, such as lack of constraints on the executive, poor
property-rights protection, as well as inefficient legal and court
systems (see Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2005 for a
review and Acemoglu and Robinson 2012 for an influential
popular argument). Other works downplay the role of formal
institutions, emphasising instead the importance of geographical
features, informal cultural norms, genetic, and epidemiological
traits (see Spolaore and Wacziarg 2013 for a review, and
Diamond 1997 and Landes 1998 on popular arguments on the
importance of geography and culture, respectively).
Empirical issues
The key conceptual and econometric challenge in isolating the
role of institutions is that these features interact with cultural
traits – such as religion, family structure, and trust – and with
geography (for example, prevalence of malaria). Favourable
geography, growth-promoting cultural traits, and institutional
capacity often go hand-in-hand. Moreover, since institutional
and economic development may be driven by common features
– for example, the colonial experience (see for example La Porta
et al. 2008, Glaeser et al. 2004, Acemoglu et al. 2008) – it is
very hard to tease out the one-way effect of national institutions
on development.
Recent research
In our paper “National Institutions and Subnational
Development in Africa” we circumvent these challenges by
developing a methodology that exploits the ‘quasi-experimental’
drawing of African national borders. This took place in the
European capitals in the mid to late 19th century, well before
African independence, at a time when Europeans had hardly
settled in the regions whose borders they were designing. The
drawing of colonial boundaries partitioned more than 200
ethnicities across two or more countries. To take advantage of
this historical accident we compare economic performance in
adjacent regions which belong to the same ancestral homeland
but fall in different countries, and which are thus subject to
different formal institutions.[1]
Implementing our approach entails two major challenges:
First, we need to identify in a systematic way ethnic homelands
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partitioned by national borders.
Second, the economic performance indicators at the local
(country-ethnicity) level are scarce.
To identify ethnic homelands we combine the George Peter
Murdock (1959) map portraying the spatial distribution of
African ethnicities in the mid to late 19th century with
contemporary national boundaries (Figure 1a). To overcome
the paucity of economic data across African regions we build on
the recent contribution of Henderson, Storeygaard, and Weil
(2012) and measure development at the ethnicity-country level
using satellite images of light density. Figure 1b below maps the
distribution of satellite light density at night at our (country-
ethnicity) level of analysis for split groups.
Figure 1.
New results
Our analysis spans all African partitioned ethnicities and reveals
new empirical regularities.
First, we document that differences in national institutions
across the border do not systematically translate into differences
in economic performance within partitioned ethnicities. While
there is a significant positive correlation between national
institutions and development across ethnic homelands, once we
properly account for geographic-ecological and ethnic-specific
differences via the inclusion of ethnicity fixed effects – which
allows us to compare development of the same ethnic group
across borders – the correlation weakens considerably and
becomes statistically insignificant. This result is robust (see
here) to various model permutations and units of analysis.[2]
Figures 2a-2b below illustrate the lack of a systematic within-
partitioned-ethnicity correlation between light density and
institutional quality at the national level using two widely used
proxies of institutions – a composite rule of law index and a
corruption index (retrieved from World Bank’s Governance
Indicators). Clearly the insignificance is not driven by a few
influential observations.
Figure 2. Economic development and national institutions:
Evidence from within ethnicities across the national borders
Figures 3a and 3b provide a visual illustration of the regression
discontinuity results that assess whether development is higher
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in the more institutionally developed side of the border. The
figures plot the average likelihood that a small pixel
(approximately 12.5 times 12.5 kilometers) is lit for bins of 5
kilometres wide in areas close to the national border (denoted
by the vertical line). The figures also plot predicted pixel-level
luminosity from a regression that includes a third-order
polynomial on distance to the border (which takes on positive
values for pixels in the relatively high institutional quality
country). There are no discernible differences in luminosity
crossing the national boundary towards the more institutionally
developed country, further demonstrating that African
development is not systematically linked to economic wellbeing
at the border.
Figure 3. National institutions and light density in 2007-08:
Dots represent local averages of 5km bins
Discussion
The lack of a systematic association between national
institutions and regional development within partitioned
African homelands cautions against extrapolating from the
positive cross-country correlations that causality is necessarily
running from institutions to development. This suggests the
need for more research to understand how the institutions-
development nexus operates.
While our results go against the conventional wisdom in
economics on the causal impact of national institutions on
development – in Africa at least – they are consistent with the
African historiography that de-emphasises the importance of
colonial and contemporary countrywide institutions in the
hinterland, stressing instead the crucial role of ethnic-speciﬁc
traits related to the role of chiefs, the slave trades, culture, and
pre-colonial political organisation (see Michalopoulos and
Papaioannou (2014) for a review).[3]
Heterogeneity and the penetration of national institutions
Second, we move beyond average effects to explore in detail the
nexus between institutions and regional development. We find
that the average effect of institutions is economically negligible
and statistically insignificant for approximately 60% of
partitioned ethnicities. Yet, for some groups, consisting of
approximately 20%-25% of the sample, a significant positive
association emerges, whereas for the remaining ones the within-
ethnicity association turns negative.
The uncovered heterogeneity begs the question of its
determinants. Building on insights from the African
historiography that stress the inability of states to broadcast
power in regions far from the capital (see for example Herbst
2000), and recent works on state capacity emphasising the
limited capacity of many African states to monopolise violence
and provide basic public goods (see for example Besley and
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and provide basic public goods (see for example Besley and
Persson 2011), we examine the spatial distribution of the
uncovered heterogeneity.
The historiography has put forward several arguments on why
African states face insurmountable challenges in broadcasting
power beyond the capitals.
Since Europeans mostly ruled from the capitals via the infamous
‘indirect rule’ strategy where rural areas were governed via local
chiefs and a small number of colonial administrators, there were
limited investments on institutional capacity during the colonial
period in Africa. Due to institutional persistence, contemporary
national institutions would have had limited reach far from the
capital cities.
Similarly, the challenging geography of many African states
(desert areas, rugged terrains, and rainforests), produced by the
Scramble for Africa resulted in many countries having peculiar
shapes.[4] This made it quite hard both for colonial and post-
colonial authorities to exert power on the hinterland, especially
because of limited infrastructure investments outside of capital
cities.[5]
Figures 4a-4b provide a graphical illustration of the differential
association between national institutions and regional
development within partitioned groups. When we focus on
pixels of split ethnicities that are relatively close to the
respective capitals on both sides of the border (Figure 4a), pixel-
level luminosity on the side with better-functioning national
institutions is significantly higher. In contrast, when we zoom in
on pixels that are relatively far from the respective capital cities
(Figure 4b) there are no differences in luminosity, despite
differences in national institutions.
Figure 4. National institutions and light density in 2007-08:
Dots represent local averages of 5km bins; all bins close to the
capital
We present complementary evidence – summarised in Figures
5a-5b below – on the limited penetration of national
institutions. Expanding our analysis to the universe of African
groups, we show that the explanatory power of national
institutions on regional development decays for ethnic
homelands (and pixels within groups) further from the capital
centres.
Figure 5a. Institutions’ impact and proximity to the capital:
Ethnicity-country fixed effects estimates, conditional on rich set
of controls
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Figure 5b. Institutions’ impact and proximity to the capital:
Ethnicity-country fixed effects estimates, conditional on rich set
of controls
Finally, we use individual-level data from the Afrobarometer
Surveys spanning more than 20,000 respondents across 17
countries to show that law enforcement weakens monotonically
as one moves further from the capitals. Moreover, ethnic
identification as opposed to national one strengthens further
from the capitals. These results further illustrate the limited
state presence in the hinterland.
Discussion
These correlations vividly illustrate the limited penetration of
the state in remote areas, suggesting that – at least within Africa
– treating countries as homogeneous entities where nationwide
institutions exert a uniform influence may be quite misleading.
The uncovered patterns support an old idea among
development scholars (see for example Lewis 1954) and
political scientists (see for example Migdal 1988) of the
coexistence in Africa of a ‘dual’ economic-institutional
framework with customary rules being dominant in the
countryside and colonial-national institutions becoming
relevant for regions closer to the capitals (see also Herbst 2000).
Summary
Our approach combines anthropological maps on the spatial
distribution of ethnicities at the time of colonisation with
satellite-image data on light density at night. These are available
at a very fine grid and can thus be easily aggregated at the
country-ethnic homeland level. Our analysis reveals two new
findings.
First, we find that differences between countrywide institutional
structures across the national border do not explain within-
ethnicity differences in economic performance.
Second, the average non-effect of national institutions on ethnic
development masks considerable heterogeneity, partially driven
by the diminishing role of national institutions in areas further
from the capital cities.
These results stand in contrast to previous, mostly cross-country
works in economics; yet the evidence supports arguments put
forward by the African historiography stressing the key role of
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forward by the African historiography stressing the key role of
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[1] There is little ambiguity on the artificial drawing of African
colonial borders that endured after African independence. As
the British Prime Minister at the time of the ‘Scramble for
Africa’ Lord Salisbury put it in a famous tally, “”we have been
engaged in drawing lines upon maps where no white man’s feet
have ever trod; we have been giving away mountains and rivers
and lakes to each other, only hindered by the small impediment
that we never knew exactly where the mountains and rivers and
lakes were.”” In Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (The Long
Run Effects of the Scramble for Africa, NBER WP 17620) we
show that the drawing of political boundaries is not
systematically linked to various geographical, ecological,
economic, and political pre-colonial features. (see Vox for a
review).
[2] The benchmark unit of analysis is a partitioned ethnic
region; we also take advantage of the finer structure of the
luminosity data to obtain multiple observations within each
partition and identify the effect of national institutions at the
border.
[3] Recent works emphasise the long-lasting effects of the slave
trades (e.g. Nunn 2008), pre-colonial ethnic-specific political
centralisation (e.g. Gennaioli and Rainer 2007, Michalopoulos
and Papaioannou 2013a), ethnic partitioning (e.g. Alesina,
Easterly, and Matuszeski 2012, Michalopoulos and
Papaioannou 2013c). See Nunn (2013) for a recent review of
studies illustrating the legacy of historical events.
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studies illustrating the legacy of historical events.
[4] For example, the Casamance region in Southern Senegal
(where the partitioned Diola-Jola reside) is isolated from Dakar,
as Gambia effectively cuts Senegal into two parts. Likewise, the
rainforest of Central Africa limits the presence of the
government of the Democratic Republic of Congo in the
Eastern provinces of North and South Kivu, located hundreds
of miles away from Kinshasa. The latter are quite often ruled by
local militias and rebel groups.
[5] Herbst (2000) reproduces a quote of a senior official in
Central African Republic saying that “”the State stops at PK
12, twelve kilometres from the capital, Bangui.””
